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Abstract
This study is an attempt to explore the relation between the new corporate
governance enforcement in the Gulf -GCC- countries and management
performance at large. Independent variables within corporate governance
cluster have been identified to determine their possible effect on other
dependent variables within the cluster of management performance. The study
provides empirical support of the added value of corporate governance at both
the national as well as the regional level.
A deductive research method is adopted to better identify the problem and
reach some conclusions. It includes a recognized statistical testing as well as
a basic arithmetic model to build up some relationships which may lead to
some sort of correlations that assist in interpreting and determining
perceptions toward the issue. Results have shown noticeable impact of the
same across the tested data and calls for more rigid enforcement of legislative
governance among GCC firms.
Keywords: corporate governance - management performance - Board
Composition - Governance Measurement - Governance Index.
The Rise of Global Corporate Governance
It has always believed that corporate governance has risen worldwide due
to the late financial scandal in the west. However, the theme has a wider
scope and a multi-faceted subject. One of which, is to ensure the
accountability of certain individuals in an organization through mechanisms
that try to reduce or eliminate agency problems (Robins, 2006). Actually,
corporate governance momentum has been adopted as some sort of logo
or supreme cause since 2001 due to the collapses of high profile
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companies in the industrial world such as Enron and WorldCom. The US Government
had to interfere in regulating businesses and restoring confidence in the community
by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Corporate governance is not a new concept in the world of business management. It goes
back to the 19th century when the famous agency theory was introduced on the
background of public corporations and the need to separate their functions from those of
the owners, as well as to maintain some method of control over management performance
(AlWazer, 2007: p.2).
Regardless to the various definitions of corporate governance, it encompasses the
mechanism of which a business organized in a limited liability corporate form is to be
controlled (Gregory and Simmelkjaer, 2002, p.8). Others consider it as laws, regulations,
and voluntary practices which result in best performance by humans and maximizing
the net worth of the entity by securing and safeguarding its interests (Bauer, Guenster
and Otten, 2004; Bianco, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Cremers
and Nair, 2005; Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann, 2004; Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003;
Han, 2006; Hartzell and Kallberg, 2008; Shin and Stulz, 2000). Different theoretical
perspectives on corporate governance have been overviewed and further elaborated
by many scholars within various domains (Dignam and Lowry, 2006). This all comes
from the ground of corporate governance and effective components such as
transparency and enforceability of the rights and prerogatives of all shareholders and
directors of the business entity. Therefore, corporate governance is regarded as an
internal system of policies and procedures which serve the requirements of shareholders
and other stakeholders of the business entity in general (O'Donovan, 2006; 2003). All in
all, the definition basically refers to all sorts of relationship, policies, and strategies
among shareholders, stakeholders, creditors, board of directors, and government
agencies aiming at efficiency in corporate performance (OECD, 2004).
International Researchers are arguing that corporate governance is static and that cross-
sectional differences rather than time-series changes explain the effect of corporate
governance on performance, but the short time span does not allow test how severe the
endogeneity issue actually is. Countries all over the world converge toward governance
standards which will likely broaden the scope of future corporate governance research. A
parametric index will enable us to focus on all measures of corporate governance, but not
on ownership concentration. As institutional ownership is increasing and the role of
shareholders is becoming more prominent, future research may incorporate this external
governance mechanism in the analysis (Bauer et al, 2009).
Despite the fact that corporate governance has given rise to number of claims and other
legal suits against corporation management for negligence and poor performance (OCED,
2004), but it has many blessings. Corporate governance affects the development and
functioning of capital markets and exerts a strong influence on resource allocation. In an
era of increasing capital mobility and globalisation, it has also become an important
framework condition affecting the industrial competitiveness and economies of developing
countries (Maher and Andersson, 1999).
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Other has addressed some of the underlying factors that promote efficient corporate
governance, and examines some of the strengths, weaknesses and economic implications
associated with various corporate governance systems. Through a survey of empirical
evidence on the link between corporate governance, firm performance and economic
growth, differences have been found between countries' corporate governance systems
due to the difference in the ownership and control of firms that exist across countries.
There are tradeoffs between ownership concentration and voting power concentration
(Berglof, 1997; Maher and Andersson, 1999).
The Present Status of Corporate Governance in the Gulf Co-
Operation Council Countries (GCC)
Indeed, a 2008 survey of Middle Eastern and North African corporate governance practices
by the Dubai-based Hawkamah corporate governance institute and the Washington-
based International Finance Corporation found that not a single publicly listed company
in the region followed best practice, and only 3% of surveyed firms followed good practice.
Most firms said they did not have better practices because it was not required. This Lack
of transparency would certainly make it more difficult to make sound investment decisions.
Accordingly to Hawkamah survey in 2009 (table 1), compliant with corporate governance
guidelines is to some extent moderate with 50% of the states are below an average
compliance with these guidelines (HCGI, 2009).
Table 1: Comparison of Corporate Governance Framework in the GCC with IIF
Guidelines (on Scale of 1-5 with 5 being fully compliant)
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi United Arab
Arabia Emirates
Minority Shareholder 2.0 4.0 3.0 2.5 3.5 2.5
Protection
Voting Rights 1.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.0 3.5
Firm Capital Structure 1.5 4.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 2.0
Shareholder Meeting/ 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 2.5
Other rights
Structure and Responsibilities 2.0 1.5 3.5 1.5 2.0 1.5
of the Board of Directors
Board Structure 1.0 1.5 3.5 1.5 1.0 1.0
Disclosure 4.0 3.5 5.0 1.5 4.0 3.5
Others 1.0 0.5 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.0
Accounting & Auditing 2.0 2.5 4.0 2.0 2.5 2.0
Standards 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 2.5
Audit Committee 0.5 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transparency of 2.5 3.5 3.5 1.0 4.5 2.5
Ownership & Control
Regulatory Environment 2.0 2.0 4.5 2.5 2.5 2.0
Overall Assessment 2.0 3.0 3.5 2.0 3.0 2.0
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In part, the traditional lack of awareness of corporate governance issues in the GCC is
down to the region's historic isolation from the global economy, large regional banks that
were on hand to provide cash for companies, strong economic growth, and undeveloped
capital markets. The Gulf's family-owned businesses, which account for some 90% of
commerce in the region, often shy away from disclosing details of their business affairs;
and in many cases, government-related enterprises, are murky, too. (Watts, 2009). A growing
number of regional policy makers and business leaders are seeing that sound corporate
governance can be a source of competitive advantage. Equitable treatment of shareholders,
well-defined board responsibilities, high standards of integrity and ethics, and full
disclosure and transparency can help align management's interests with shareholders'
interests. Sound governance practices also help to minimize conflicts of interest, and
leave less room for corruption and mismanagement.
A survey by the Dubai-based Hawkamah corporate governance institute and the
Washington-based International Finance Corporation in 2008 found that not a single
publicly listed company in the region followed best practice, and only 3% of surveyed
firms followed good practice. Most firms said they did not have better practices because
it was not required. This is seen as Lack of transparency would certainly make it more
difficult to make sound investment decisions (Hawkamah, 2009).
According to a survey of 581 Gulf companies by UAE bank, the national investor, banks
and companies in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have the lowest standards of corporate
governance in the GCC. Even tough, it was found that two-thirds of companies surveyed
had improved their corporate governance practices during the prior year (DIFC, 2009).
Corporate governance practices across the GCC are lagging behind global standards in a
number of areas. However, there appears to be considerable agreement that a stronger
equity culture needs to be fostered and that high priority should be assigned now to
programs to enhance corporate governance. We are encouraged by the determination of
Hawkamah, the DIFC and national authorities in this area (Dallara, 2009).
Pressure for Corporate Governance in the GCC
The banking sector in the GCC has made a significant contribution, following undertakings
by central banks to comply with Basel I and II requirements. Central banks in all six GCC
countries have amended their banking regulations to include corporate governance-
related requirements such as establishing transparency and disclosure in financial
statements, establishment of a board level audit, nomination and compensation committees
and improved risk management (Dabdoub, 2009).
In the case of the GCC report, corporate governance frameworks through the lens of
professional investors are vital in global markets, with assessments based on the IIF
Code of Corporate Governance. From an investor perspective, it is important that there is
visible movement in the right direction across the region, which can contribute to building
confidence. But hopes are there that the public and the private sectors in the region can
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work together in the period ahead to secure improvements in the GCC's overall corporate
governance framework (Baker, 2009).
Developments for strict enforcement of corporate governance code of practices in the
GCC have been largely driven by four key factors: capital market regulators whom are
using the recent price correction in GCC stock markets to 'upgrade' corporate governance
frameworks, public pressure to intervene, due to their past encouragement of widespread
public participation in IPOs, capital market authorities in the GCC- the Muscat and Abu
Dhabi exchanges introduced codes in 2003 and 2006 respectively, while regulators in
the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait have draft similar codes in 2007, and
finally increased corporate activity by GCC corporations in international markets is
contributing to improvements in private sector standards, in-line with international
best practice. GCC corporations have conducted USD25.9 billion of acquisitions in the
UK, Europe and North America so far this year (Heineman, 2010).
Earnings mitigations on the other hand, has also give rise to banks Corporate governance
as it formulated a phenomenon especially in huge capital markets such as the US.
Certainly, this will end up in inflating valuations of assets and may result in another
financial crisis (Warfield & Cheng, 2005). Similar studies were conducted in developing
countries and reached astonishing remarks with respect to the effect of corporate
governance to the business continuity that could embrace doubts to the public related
to transparency and trust worthy transactions (Shah, et al, 2009; Luohe, et. Al, 2008;
Jean, et al., 2004). In fact, it is said that the institutionalization of economic reform and
corporate governance around the world is one of the fundamental challenges of
promoting democracy and economic stability. A link has also been identified between
democracy and economic growth, especially when proper governance mechanisms are
prevalent (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008; Rivera-Batiz, 2002; Sekaran, 2006; Wen
and Philomena, 2006).
GCC seem eager to liberalize and expand their economies and markets and attract
international capital flows. As much as these markets appeal to international investors,
the achievement of these ends and the ability to sustain them place regulators under
pressure to establish well-governed financial markets. Consequently, a culture of sound
corporate governance, where shareholders ensure that they are treated equally, their
rights are respected, their best interests are pursued by directors and managers and
transparency and disclosure rules are imposed, will gradually emerge among all market
participants. Citizens will come to realize that their rights as shareholders in companies are
to a large extent equivalent to their rights as nationals in their countries. This is in line with
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) description of companies as republics where the
rights of shareholders mirror those of citizens in their nations and where the fiduciary
duties of boards of directors and managers, respectively, resemble to a great extent those
of parliamentary members and ministers. Thus, citizens will learn to adopt an active, rather
than a passive, role in their countries. Consequently, an awareness of democratic practices
will become prevalent among the communities of the Arab countries. These include the
right to elect representatives who are accountable for acting according to the will of the
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people and responsible for delegating decisions to ministers and examining the
performance of the government.
An environment in which citizens have the power to hold ministers and governmental
authorities accountable and to replace them when necessary is regarded as a democracy.
In such a setting, citizens would also press to be allowed to express their opinions
freely; have access to transparent information on the activities of the authorities, the
government and the public institutions; and impose disciplinary actions on corrupt
behaviors. In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, improvements at the public
level have already started to take effect. According to the World Bank, regulatory
quality and control of corruption are two aspects of public governance that have
particularly improved. Over the past decade, the two measures respectively increased
from averages of 0.44 and 0.11 to averages of 0.54 and 0.69 for the GCC countries
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2008).
Recent changes in GCC governance patterns that significantly altered power relations
and wealth distribution in global commodity chains addressed by many scholars (Marcia
et al, 2008; Illoong et al, 2008; Butzbach & Di Carlo, 2008). It emphasizes the rise of a
financial sphere made up of institutional investors and executives of large corporations at
the top of GCCs, and discusses the consequences of this for supplier relations and
working conditions of women workers at the base of GCCs. Also, it links recent governance
debates at the level of the firm to issues of governance of the whole chain, it identifies
three distinct normative views (shareholder, stakeholder and institutional) of the ways in
which the distribution of social welfare can be improved in GCCs. Beyond the shareholder
and stakeholder views, calls are made for strengthening an institutional view of GCC
governance (Florence, 2008).
Importance of the Study
The financial crisis has led to tightened liquidity across the world. But in the Gulf, there
are signs that intensified competition for capital has heightened interest in corporate
governance issues. Earlier 2009 year, the Qatar Financial Markets Authority brought in a
corporate governance code for all listed companies, based on the 'comply-or-explain'
approach seen in the UK. In the UAE from 2010, all listed companies will be obliged to
comply with corporate governance rules; currently, it's voluntary. And in Saudi Arabia,
too, capital markets policymakers are making more and more corporate governance
regulations compulsory. The Saudi capital market authority has issued a draft code for
corporate governance for publicly trading Saudi companies (Almutairi, 2003).
At the same time, groups such as Hawkamah are adding to the momentum. Other examples
include the Dubai-based Mudara Institute of Directors, which has launched an initiative
to educate company board members about best practices in corporate governance. And
last November, the Middle East Investor Relations Society held its inaugural awards
ceremony, based on a Thomson Reuters Excel survey of fund managers who invest in the
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region. Events such as these raise awareness of corporate governance issues among the
region's top brass (MID, 2009).
As policymakers ponder reform, strengthening governance in the banking and financial
sector is critical, where financial intermediation in the Gulf is largely bank-based, rather
than markets-based, so good corporate governance among financial institutions may
help lower systemic risk. Furthermore, reforms should also target family-owned businesses,
and enterprises linked to the state (Saidi, 2009).
Despite indications that sound corporate governance practices are taking root in the
region, cases similar to that of Damas International also occur in the US, and the UK,
where the principles of good corporate governance have been established longer than in
the Gulf (Schutzmann, 2010).
Downward corrections in GCC stock markets and increased corporate activity by GCC
corporations in Western markets are driving improvements in corporate governance
standards (IIF, 2009). IIF report is part of a co-ordinate strategy toward the harmonization
of corporate governance standards in the GCC and their alignment with international best
practice and to benchmark standards in the region. It is the result of a series of meetings
held with senior officials from capital market authorities, central banks and stock exchanges,
local fund managers, lawyers, experts, accountants and management consultants involved
in corporate governance in the GCC (IIF, 2009, p. 7).
The Hawkamah-IIF survey shows that corporate governance in the GCC is generally at an
early stage of development. However, it also notes that real progress is being made as
countries amend existing company laws, strengthen accounting frameworks, and introduce
corporate governance requirements for companies. Good corporate governance is a key
factor in sustaining economic growth and development in the GCC. Policy makers are
taking the lead and committing to secure significantly higher standards of corporate
governance in the member countries of the GCC (Saidi, 2009).
This article contributes to the existing corporate governance literature in three ways.
First, instead of relying on self-constructed governance measures, corporate governance
performance indicators were used, which are widely used in practice and includes most of
the governance mechanisms that are relevant for investors. This measurement is based
on multiple categories and thus represents a much more complete proxy of corporate
governance than, for example, the often-used G-Index constructed by Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick (appreviated GIM - 2003). The G-Index is based on the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) surveys and covers only two categories of corporate governance:
investor rights and takeover protection (Bauer et al, 2009).
The use of a governance index has the advantage of capturing the effects of all individual
governance mechanisms in one single number (Boehren and Odegaard 2003, Black et al,
2006). To my knowledge, this is the first GCC study that exploits a comprehensive corporate
governance measurement.
Malaysian Accounting Review, Special Issue Vol. 9 No. 2, 2010
146
Second, investigation is also conducted to the governance-performance relation to the
enforcement of international accounting standards which have been adopted widely in
the region. It is rational to presume that such standards would enhance the governance
theme and improve corporate performance as observed in western economies.
The third contribution of the article is that we use a broad set of performance measures
and methodologies to estimate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance.
This, in turn, will contribute in boosting the added value of these firms in the economic
growth and the financial stability of the GCC countries.
Literature Review: Corporate Governance and Performance
A large body of corporate governance literature investigates the relation between
corporate governance and performance. Most studies focus on one specific aspect of
governance such as ownership structure, board composition or executive compensation,
and relate this to performance. In their widely cited paper, GIM (2003) construct a so-
called G-Index, in which takeover provisions are used as a proxy for the level of
shareholder rights. The creation of an index allows for alternative methodologies, but it
should be noted that the G-Index is based on one aspect of corporate governance only
(Bauer, 2009).
The quality of corporate governance and corporate efficiency as well as management
performance has been a focal point for many studies indicating the justification and level
of premium that investors are willing to pay for shares of corporations with high governance.
A survey by Mckinsey in 2000 and 2002 on over 200 international investment companies
has shown that 80% of them are accepting to pay such premium for this governance
(Mckinsey and Company 2002). The findings of this survey include variances in the
amount of premium to be paid for corporate governance according to the country under
study and the level of transparency in the financial disclosure.
De Nicolò et al (2006) have conducted a two stage study on the evidence of corporate
performance and the enforcement of corporate governance. The first stage is an attempt
to validate if corporate governance has improved for any reason, while the second stage
was to investigate the effect of corporate governance on corporate performance and
consequently on productivity and financial stability. The study was basically based on a
comparison between the de facto measures and de jure measures in order to measure
accomplishment with legislation requirements. Their attempt ended in finding a widespread
measurement known the CGO based on the accounting published data and other
information for non listed companies in local market in order to reach market discipline
status. The premise within this measurement is setting an average parameter that combine
three measurements; accounting standards, earning smoothing, and stock price
Synchronicity - R2 (see Leuz et al, 2003; Morck et al, 2000). The study resulted in three
interesting results; first it concluded that CGO in the selected countries within the period
1994-2003 has shown progress due to improvements in the financial transparency. Second,
countries have close CGO's and those shown low measures have taken actions toward
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improvements. Finally, improvements in CGO have deep effect on the micro as well as
the macro economic indicators of the country.
Corporate governance is embedded in the cultural, legal, and financial frameworks of
various countries. These frameworks have given rise to two models of corporate
governance: market and control (Lane et al, 2006). The market model of corporate
governance is common in countries where capital markets are highly liquid and
shareholders are widely dispersed, such as in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Ireland. This model involves a large dispersed class of investors with no prior
connections to the companies listed on the public exchanges (Coombes and Watson,
2001). The focus of corporate governance reform in countries employing this model is
on board structures and practices that ensure that the board is a distinct entity, capable
of objectivity and able to act separately from management (Gregory and  Simmelkjaer,
2002). While the control model of corporate governance, commonly found in Asia, Latin
America, and much of continental Europe, is prevalent where control rights are not fully
separated from ownership and ownership tends to be concentrated. An example of a
control model company is Fiat SA, Italy's third most valuable company (LaPorta, Lopex-
de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999), where ultimate control (over 25%) belongs to the Agnelli
family and members of that family are also board members and part of management
teams. U.S. examples of this are the Ford family, which maintains approximately 40%
voting power, and the Sulzberger family, owners of the New York Times, where the
family owns 18% of the company while maintaining voting control over board members
through a special class of stock not available to outsiders (Lane et al, 2006).
Studies on the effect of corporate governance on financial stability are quite few as well
nascent in nature probably due to lack of well defined financial stability. The same
notion is noticed in corporate governance as a clear and generally accepted definition
as well as measurement of the governance is still lacking.
Therefore, studies have been reset toward measuring financial soundness rather than
financial stability, regardless of the size and content of such measurement (Das et al,
2004; Mishkin, 1991 and 1999). Adding financial and non-financial data of non-banking
sectors has also shown remarkable results as corporate governance clearly declined
especially in developing and less developed countries (Das et al, 2004). Also, it has
been concluded that there are four vital elements for acceptable corporate governance.
These interactive elements are independence, transparency, accountability, and integrity
(Das and Quintyn, 2002). Further, Das et al, 2004 have produced another measure for
organisational governance called RGI that is a mere weighted average of countries
compliance with the aforementioned elements. Obviously, developed countries have
higher average of corporate governance. It is worth mentioning that in their test for
governance rates, Das et al (2004) have relied on three major parameters namely; the
economic environment at large in the country -the financial status, inflation rates, and
interest rates; the organisational structure of the banking system, and the infra structure
for corporate governance such as the legislation, commercial laws, and governance in
the public sector.
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The effect of regulatory environments on the relation between corporate governance
and firm valuation-as discussed by La Porta et al. (1998; 2000; 2002)-has been studied
using aggregate corporate governance measures. Klapper and Love (2004) find, using
a sample of 500 firms across 25 emerging countries, that firm-level corporate governance
is most important in countries with poor investor protection. They note that a strong
institutional setting may act as a substitute for firm-level corporate governance. Similarly,
Durnev and Kim (2005) investigate the effect of legal environments on corporate
governance practices in a multicountry setting. Using the CLSA database, they find for
a sample of 859 firms in 27 countries that investment opportunities, the need for external
financing and ownership structure all affect the quality of corporate governance.
Furthermore, firms with better governance enjoy higher valuation as measured by Tobin's
q. Most importantly, all these relations are stronger in less investor-friendly countries.
There is a serious amount of effort being placed into addressing corporate responsibility
at the top of financial service organizations. Shareholders and regulators have made
clear the need for organizations to tighten up their risk management, governance and
compliance activities following a series of recent and high profile compliance failures
and scandals (such as Enron) and the introduction of new rules and legislative changes
to financial practice.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SARBOX) has the stated objective: 'to protect investors by improving
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the security laws'.
The rules set by SARBOX are very much in the public and media arena and firmly lay
down the gauntlet for all financial organizations to meet stringent financial reporting and
certification mandates by specific deadlines. Public and private companies alike must
ensure their performance metrics are detailed, explained and auditable (Rogers, 2009).
European accounting standards are also being updated to reflect the same sort of controls
as SARBOX and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is looking for far more detailed
evidence from organizations through the reporting of sound operational governance.
The effectiveness of challenge at board level - in relation to the determination and approval
of strategy, risk appetite and the management of risk - is identified by Walker report as a
particular weakness (Walker, 2009). The report recommends that such shortcomings should
be addressed by better leadership by the chairperson of the board, as well as non executive
directors to have greater skills, experience, time and ultimately access to critical information
particularly in relation to the present and future risk profile of the firm. In respect of risk
governance, Walker makes a number of constructive suggestions in relation to the creation
of a board risk committee that resulted in an ineffective challenge at some firms during the
recent crisis (ACI, 2009).
As far as the effect of governance on performance is concerned, several scholars have
tested the predictions of recent theories then linking those measures with corporate
performance and dividend policy. In regard to performance, the results point to a sizable
and robust effect of governance measure on both the return on assets and Tobin's q
(Bebczuk, 2005; Das et al, 2004).
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A great deal of attention has been given to understanding how corporate governance and
ownership structures affect firm performance. Corporate governance can influence a
firm's performance whenever a conflict of interest arises between management and
shareholders and/or between controlling and minority shareholders. The root of both
conflicts is the fact that the manager in the first case, and the controlling shareholders in
the second case, receive only a portion of the firm's net revenue, while they fully appropriate
the resources diverted (Bebczuk, 2005). Thus, it is conceivable that, in light of this incentive
structure, insiders will maximize their (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) utility even when
the firm as a whole will not. The ability to fulfil these goals is conditioned on the power
insiders have in the company's decision-making process. (See La Porta et al., 1999, and
Claessens et al., 1999; 2002).
Outsiders have two main instruments to counterbalance this power: the enforcement of
adequate corporate governance standards and the quality of the regulatory and legal
environment, which should discourage detrimental actions by insiders and, once
committed, allow affected stakeholders to challenge them through corporate and judicial
channels.
While a wedge between control and cash flow rights is likely to harm minority shareholders
and corporate valuation, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Johnson, S. et al. (1999), and Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) make the point that concentrated ownership may actually have
an ambiguous beneficial effect on performance and valuation, the so-called incentive
effect.
International evidence has greatly increased in the last few years. Claessens et al. (1999),
Klapper and Love (2002) and La Porta et al. (2002) are prominent efforts in proving the
nexus between corporate governance and performance using cross-country data, while
other studies look at individual countries, such as the United States (see Gompers, Ishii
and Metrick, 2003), Korea (see Black, Jang and Kim, 2003) and Germany (see Drobetz,
Schillhoffer and Zimmermann, 2003). By aiming to analyze the relationship between
corporate governance and ownership structure with performance (as measured by the
return on assets and Tobin's q) in Argentina in 2000-2003, the present work forms part of
the latter country-level line of research.
All in all, these and other studies have shown positive impact for corporate governance
on the economy at large and on the management level as well. The overall interaction
among factors affecting corporate governance either directly or indirectly has been
named governance nexus which comply with the new institutional economics school
(Alwazer, 2007). It is, thus, up to policy makers in a given country to mitigate corporate
governance nexus to the betterment of the whole economic state and boost corporate
performance.
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The Study
Studies for long time have measured organizational dimensions on the enforcement of
corporate governance and its effect on performance. These include the size of corporation,
organization structure, and directors' compensation among other factors leading to
effective corporate governance which enhance corporation performance (Baysinger and
Butler, 1985).
The purpose of this study is to investigate perceptions toward the enforcement of
corporate governance and its impact on management performance in the GCC. This
requires in addition to survey analysis, testing for the variables effecting such
perceptions among concerned parties. The perceptions of the concerned would thus,
formulate a measure to test the possibility of enforcing such regulations and the
likelihood for its success.
No doubt that such study is of paramount importance for the GCC as businesses are
growing and just has recovered from the aftermath of the world financial crisis. There
were some reported cases of scandals locally that have evolved the issue (IIF, 2009). Let
alone, the tightened stiff regulations that have been passed by local authorities to regulate
businesses in the region either as a response to international agencies requirements such
as Basil requirements for banks, or in other cases obeying to local authorities like central
banks and capital market authorities. Moreover, corporate governance once been adopted
and enforced in a systematic manner, this would certainly improve business practices in
the whole region leading to a code of best practices.
Hypothesis
A study of this kind has to commence from a point of similar studies in the field were
variables have tested as correlated to the subject (Bauer et al, 2009). The lack of alike
studies in the region, in addition to the nascent issue under investigation put constrain
on the researcher freedom to select many variables for testing. The topic is seen more
complicated as people tend to confront governance leading to restricting their natural
capabilities to perform in a more flexible environment. This is widely noticed in different
cultures and various business models all over the world (Almutairi, 2003).
Corporate governance in the region is at its embryonic stage where experiences are
limited and some sort of confrontation is highly expected by decision makers to fully
obey to its enforcement. It is actually driven by the notion that official regulation of
the matter is absolutely scares as well as codes of practices in the same are so limited
(Hawkamah, 2009). Thus, it is logical to base an empirical study on the hypothesis
that independent variables of corporate governance have minimum effect on
management performance. Therefore, the study has to test for the following
hyphothesis;
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Hypothesis 1. Corporate governance enforcement has a positive impact on management
performance in the GCC.
Hypothesis 2. Independent corporate governance variables have more effect on
performance than dependent variables.
Dependent variables that would affect the testing of the sought relationship have no
direct effect on management performance. The justification for this is basically driven
from the premise that poor enforcement of corporate governance by local businesses
is caused by their ultimate goals to mitigate performance and inflate their earnings. I
believe that such notion, by itself is enough to explore perceptions toward the subject
and test for its validity.
Methodology & Sample
For a study of this kind, one would have to lean to a recognized statistical testing as
well as a basic arithmetic model to build up some relationships which may lead to some
sort of correlations that assist in interpreting and determining perceptions toward the
issue. Once concluded, then perceptions could be treated accordingly in order to achieve
better enforcement of corporate governance among the growing business community
in the whole region. In this case, a deductive research method is adopted to better
identify the problem and reach some conclusions.
Moreover, it is obvious that the society for governance is very limited and classified as
sensitive to cooperate and disclose what is considered of paramount importance and
has the highest security level. No one should be allowed to get access to it albeit the
fact that in most cases an access to such information will lead to almost nothing as
governance is totally not documented, if rarely applied.
Therefore, the society sample has to be chosen based on a given parameter or recognized
conditions. Since the only available way to get appropriate information is to rely on
corporations published data and on interviews. Questionnaires, on the other hand, are
avoided as the output of such mean would not necessarily reflect actually responses,
thus the validity of testing, analysis, and results respectively are questioned. Many
previous studies have end up utilizing similar methodology and resulted in valid and
legitimate conclusions (Jean et al., 2004; Shah et al., 2009; Luohe et al., 2008; Good and
Seow, 2002).
The sample contains at least 5 random corporations from each of the GCC countries in
various sectors. Stock exchanges published data have been used to test for the variables.
Years of published data range from 2007 to 2009.
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The Variables
The study has multiple variables to test for. The independent variable assumed is corporate
governance represented by the supervision, guidance and control of general assembly,
board of directors, audit committee, external auditors, government's representatives, debtors,
and general stakeholders. While on the other hand, dependents variables include reported
earnings, financial leverage, cash distributions, share price, and management remunerations.
The notion here is to explore the correlation among each of the dependent variables with
respect to corporate governance as represented by its foresaid components. For example, if
a corporation is reporting high financial leverage or reported earnings in any quarter, a
correlation is tested for any change in any of the corporate governance components. Vis
versa, a correlation test is made for more corporate governance enforcement to the financial
performance.
The abbreviation given for all variables are as follows:
Independent Variable (Corporate Governance);
GA = General Assembly
BD = Board of Directors
AC = Audit Committee
EA = External Auditor
GR = Government Representatives
DB = Debtors
GS = General Stakeholders
Dependent Variables (Management Performance parameters);
RE = Reported Earnings
FL = Financial Leverage
CD = Cash Distributions
SP = Share Price
MR = Management remunerations
The General Model
In order to test for the correlation a general model was adopted to do the statistical
analysis. It is as follows;
1. Measuring the earning power of a given corporate during a set period of time
reflecting management performance for the same;
TACC it = Corporate Earnings of i company during t period;
ONI it = Net operating income for I company during t period;
OCF it = Net cash flow from operation for I company during t period;
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2. Testing for regression analysis (β) regression for a given period;
 
TACC i, t = Corporate Earnings of i company during t period;
∆REVi, t = Change in company i earnings during period t;
∆RECi, t = Change in company i receivables during period t;
PPEi, t = company i fixed asset during period t;
Ai, t – 1 = company I total assets during the period t;
ϕ i, t = random error;
β = Beta (the regression)
α = fixed denominator
3. Determining non-discretionary earnings (β1, β2, β3, .. βn ) of the sample companies;
NDACCi, t = Non – discretionary earnings for company i, during period t;
(β1, β2, β3, = regressions denominators for the same period,
4. Determining discretionary earnings of each company at the same period;
DACC I,t = Discretionary earnings of the company I, during period t;
TACCi, t = Corporate Earnings of i company during t period;
NDACCi, t = Non – discretionary earnings for company i, during period t;
Statistical Tests
Using E-Views statistical software, statistical testing was made at a confidence level
of 95%. This software was utilized in similar studies and positively resulted (Sekaran,
2006). Outputs of the testing include;
• Normal distribution test: to check for how close is the data to normal distribution
through Jarque-Bera testing at a 5% probability;
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• Multicollinearity test: using a Tolerance factor one would reach co linearity measure
for the independent factor, then finding the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) at 5%
level;
• Autocorrelation test: to validate for any error in the testing, a Durbin Watson Test
was performed;
• Heteroskedasticity test: utilizing White approach;
• Descriptive Statistical Measures: to extracts averaged data;
• Pooled Data Regression: to test for the time series analysis for the years (2005-
2009), due to the fact that the data is cross sectional which call for a binary logit
testing to explore correlation among inter-variables.
Statistical Analysis & Results
Statistical testing is shown in table 2 to table 5. Results indicate that normal distribution
of the data is proportional to reported earnings and subsequently to management
performance. Yet, through the Jarque-Beraa testing it was found that some of the
corporate governance components have greater values in such distribution than others.
For example, external auditors (128), board of directors (45.5), and debtors (32.4) have
far exceed other factors such the general assembly or even government representatives
in the corporations. By the same token, we see management remuneration has the only
noticeable readable reflections to the aforementioned inter-independent variables. This
could be interpreted as a normal reaction against the financial crisis waves that has
impacted corporations major financial decisions which could involved the most
concerned parties (the board, debtors, and external auditors).
As for the multicollinearity test, all VIF readings are below 5 which indicate that there is
no multicollinearity problem among variables. This would flag the sign of validity as to
the level of correlation among the same, without affecting the soundness of concluded
results. On the other hand, the Durbin Watson (DW) test showed 1.982 calculated
value which falls within the accepted range of 1.5-2.5. As known, DW values are usually
within the range of 0-4. While values close to zero indicate positive correlation, values
close to 4 indicate the opposite. The calculate value of 1.982 reflect confidence in the
strength of the study model and its results.
In case of the Heteroskedasticity, it is considered as an important element in regression
analysis. Moreover, for an advance testing, the White test is used once for
multicollinearity assurance of the tested data. In our case, the White calculated value
was 0.021, which is less than the generally accepted values for such testing. This again,
indicates the validity of the multi-collinearity test and the extracted results, which in
turn, reflect the inter-correlation among both independent as well as dependent variables.
The descriptive analysis of the data is also indicating some sort of corporate governance
significance. The mean of financial performance throughout year 2007, 2008, and 2009
subsequently is normal. The year 2009, however, showed lower values compared with
2007 and 2008 are logically expected. Due to the financial crisis, concerned parties
12/10/2010, 9:21 AM
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(general assembly, the board, and debtors) have assumed more responsibility which
is indicated by the percentage of general assembly attendance (60-80%), audit
committee meetings (25% increase), and lower rate of debts - less by 8% (33%-
25%). Certainly, earnings would be less than before which in turn decreased the
financial leverage by almost 3.5% (11.8-8.4%).
Table 2: Data Statistical Validity Test
Normal distribution test Multicollinearity
NO. Variable Jarque - Bera test
VIF Toleranceprobability J-B
1 CG: 0.0 23.5 - -
2 GA (Annual / Semi-Annual) 0.549 1.199 1.228 0.814
3 BD 0.010 128 1.634 0.612
4 AC 0.400 45.5 1.142 0.876
5 EA 0.815 0.408 1.478 0.677
6 GR 0.410 1.783 1.039 0.962
7 D 0.0 32.4 1.068 0.936
8 GS 0.795 0.459 1.010 0.990
9 M P - - 1.842 0.543
10 RE - - 1.323 0.756
11 FL - - 2.874 0.348
12 CD - - 1.096 0.912
13 SP - - 1.802 0.555
14 MR 0.871 0.276 1.074 0.931
15 Auto correlation 1.982
16 Heteroskedasticity (white test) 0.021




1 Discretionary earnings ($) 12632500 17624400 11675230
2 AGM Attendance 55% 62% 66%
3 Board meetings 4 6 4
4 Non-executive % 60% 60% 80%
5 Audit committee size 3 3 4
6 Audit committee meetings 4 4 5
7 Debts 33% 33% 25%
8 Company size ($) 167747800 185407200 200594300
9 Financial leverage 14.25% 11.8% 8.4%
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Table 4: Correlated Statistical Descriptions
2007 2008 2009
NO. Variable realized Not realized Not realized Not
realized realized realized
1 CG: 7 3 7 3 7 3
2 GA (Annual / Semi-Annual) 8 2 7 3 9 1
3 BD 7 3 8 2 8 2
4 AC 6 4 7 3 7 3
5 EA 7 3 8 2 8 2
6 GR 5 3 6 1 7 4
7 D 7 4 7 2 6 5
8 GS 4 3 5 1 4 3
9 M P 6 4 7 3 5 4
10 RE 4 4 6 4 3 4
11 FL 4 6 7 2 3 4
12 CD 4 5 6 2 4 6
13 SP 4 3 5 1 4 3
14 MR 6 4 7 3 5 4
Table 5: General Model Test
1 CG: Probability 2-statistic coefficient
2 GA (Annual / Semi-Annual) 0.007 0.617- 0.231
3 BD 0.218 3.193- 0.002
4 AC 0.153 1.996- 0.019
5 EA 0.011 1.279- 0.210
6 GR 0.093 1.976- 0.00
7 D 0.442 0.542- 0.321
8 GS 0.399 1.822- 0.041
9 M P 0.507 3.120- 0.003
10 RE 0.406 2.914- 0.004
11 FL 0.512 2.017- 0.002
12 CD 0.486 2.641- 0.005
13 SP 0.551 3.001- 0.006
14 MR 0.622 3.144- 0.007
All in all, some correlation is found among factors affecting corporate governance at
the large scale with variables that are usually linked to corporate performance. This
would suggest that further more elaborated in depth study seems to be a must in order
to highlight the paramount importance of the issue in the GCC business environment.
Conclusion
While corporate governance standards in the region are being raised, some concluded
remarks could be highlighted to bring the GCC into compliance with the IIF's corporate
governance code. Any policy recommendation emerging from this research should take
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into account that improving corporate governance entails the consideration of both
the private and the public interest. Controlling shareholders will not be inclined to
cooperate with such change unless the incremental benefits (acting as regular
shareholders) outweigh the loss of their private benefits of control.
A stronger commitment to better corporate governance from political authorities as well
as from senior government officials involved with capital market development is needed
for real change to take effect. Regulators should quickly introduce corporate governance
reforms in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are major contributors to the economies
of the GCC. By requiring good standards of corporate governance from suppliers and
private sector companies wishing to conduct business with SCCs, corporate sector
reform can be expedited.
Regulators in the GCC need to work more closely together to strengthen the region's
equity markets. With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, equity markets in the
region are relatively small and lack depth. Establishing a regional GCC corporate
governance task force, comprised of regulators and market participants, would help to
promote standardized, best-practice laws and regulations that would apply across all
stock markets in the region. Standardization would help eliminate systemic risks by requiring
companies issuing debt to obtain credit ratings, introduce stronger book building measures
for IPOs, and promote the development of insider trading laws and investor education.
Specialized courts to deal with the enforcement of securities laws also need to be
established. This will expedite the delivery of justice for securities and finance-related
offences and reduce the cost of litigation.
Increase financial transparency by harmonizing financial reporting requirements.
Standardized financial reporting is especially needed for annual reports to shareholders.
Establish a registrar of companies, requiring all companies (from sole proprietorship to
joint stock companies) to provide information. This will help non-listed companies to
develop better financial reporting practices.
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